Location: 9 mi (14 km) South of Savannah, TN Map
Area: 4,000 acres (16 km2)
Shiloh National Military Park is located 9 mi (14 km) South of Savannah, Tennessee in United States. It covers an area of 4,000 acres (16 km2) of a site where Battle of Shiloh. The bloody battle of Shiloh lasted for two day, April 6 and April 7, 1862, and involved about 65,000 Union troops under command of general Ulysses S. Grant and Don Carlos Buell and 44,000 Confederates under leadership of Albert Sidney Johnston (killed in the battle) and P.G.T. Beauregard. The battle resulted in nearly 24,000 killed, wounded, and missing on both sides. The two days of fighting did not end in a decisive tactical victory for either side, the Union forces held the battlefield, but failed to pursue the withdrawing Confederate forces.
The land around Shiloh National Military Park is flat. The highest point around is 181 meters above sea level. The area around Shiloh National Military Park has a small population, with 15 people per square kilometer. The closest major city is Savannah, 12.8 km north of Shiloh National Military Park.
Permanent exhibitions, films,
displays and self-guided 12-mile Auto Tour, stopping at the Peach
Orchard, the Hornet's Nest and General Johnston's death site.
Shiloh National Cemetery
Shiloh National Cemetery is in the
northeast corner of the park adjacent to the visitor center and
bookstore. Buried within its 20.09 acres (81,300 m2) are 3584 Union
dead (of whom 2357 are unknown), who were re-interred in the
cemetery created after the war, in 1866. There are two Confederate
dead interred in the cemetery. The cemetery operations were
transferred from War Department to the National Park Service in
1933. An unknown number of Confederate dead are interred in mass
graves in the park.
After the loss of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February 1862,
Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston withdrew his forces to
western Tennessee, northern Mississippi, and Alabama to reorganize. In
early March, Union General Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, commanding forces
in the western theater of operations, responded by ordering General
Grant to move his army up the Tennessee River (ie, south).
Because of a strong professional and personal dislike of Grant, Halleck
had initially appointed Major General C.F. Smith to lead the expedition
while Grant was to remain passive at Fort Henry, but after President
Lincoln intervened and Smith was wounded, Grant was restored to full
command. Grant's orders from Halleck were to link up with Buell's Army
of the Ohio, which was en route from Nashville, proceed south in a joint
offensive and capture the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, a vital supply
line between the Mississippi Valley and the Confederate capital of
Richmond, Virginia.
Grant's army of 48,894 men consisted of 6
divisions under Major Generals John A. McClernand, and Lew Wallace and
Brigadier Generals W.H.L. Wallace, Stephen A. Hurlbut, William T.
Sherman, and Benjamin Prentiss. Five of the divisions were encamped on
the west bank of the Tennessee River. Over the course of the war, Grant
developed a reputation for being more concerned with his own plans than
those of the enemy. The camp at Pittsburg Landing was where this lack of
interest had the most serious consequences. The army was scattered in
bivouacs, many around a small church called Shiloh – the Hebrew name for
"peaceful place" The church had been built in 1854 by the Methodist
Episcopal Church, South.
While the army lay at Pittsburg Landing,
it was busy training the many new recruits it had received while waiting
for Buell, and did not expend effort in building fortifications or
carrying out other defensive measures. In his memoirs, Grant responded
to much criticism of his lack of fortifications: "Besides, the troops
that were with me, both officers and men, needed to learn discipline and
drill to a greater degree than they would get with pick, shovel and ax
... in any case I decided that exercise and discipline were of greater
value to our troops than fortifications. " Lew Wallace's division was 5
miles downriver at Crump's Landing, a position chosen to prevent the
Confederate army from establishing river batteries and making an advance
on the railroad at Bethel Station.
Buell's army of 17,918 men was
far from Shiloh the day before the battle. His 4 divisions were led by
Brigadier Generals Alexander M. McCook, William "Bull" Nelson, Thomas L.
Crittenden, and Thomas J. Wood.
On the Confederate side, Johnston
called his newly assembled force the Army of the Mississippi. He
gathered nearly 55,000 men around the city of Corinth in Mississippi,
approx. 30 km southwest of Grant's position. Of these, 44,699 departed
Corinth on April 3, hoping to surprise Grant before Buell arrived. They
were organized into 4 large corps under the command of:
Major General
Leonidas Polk with two divisions under Brigadier General Charles Clark
and Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham
Major General. Braxton Bragg
with two divisions under Brigadier Generals Daniel Ruggles and Jones M.
Withers
Major General William J. Hardee with three brigades under
Brigadier Generals Thomas C. Hindman, Patrick Cleburne and Sterling A.
M. Wood
Brigadier General John C. Breckenridge in reserve with three
brigades under Colonels Robert Trabue and Winfield S. Stratham, and
Brigadier General John S. Bowen and attached cavalry.
The night
before the battle, the two armies were roughly equal in size, but the
Confederate army had inferior weapons, including shotguns, old
smoothbore muskets, and even soldiers with pikes. They came to the
battle with very little combat experience. Braxton Bragg's men from
Pensacola and Mobile were the best trained. Grant's army included 32 of
the 62 infantry regiments that had combat experience from Fort Donelson.
Half of his artillery and most of his cavalry also had combat
experience.
Johnston's second in command was P.G.T. Beauregard,
who encouraged Johnston not to attack Grant. He worried that the sound
of marching soldiers and soldiers testing their rifles after two days of
rain had cost them the element of surprise. Johnston rejected
Beauregard's advice and said he would attack if there were a million on
the enemy's side. Despite Beauregard's well-founded misgivings, the
Union forces did not hear the sounds of an advancing army and were
unaware that the enemy was encamped 3 miles (5 km) away.
It was
Johnston's plan to attack Grant's left wing and cut off the Union army
from the support of the gunboats and from being able to retreat up the
Tennesee River. Instead, the army was to be pushed west into the swamps
at Snake and Owl Creeks where it could be destroyed. The attack was
originally planned for April 4, but was delayed for 48 hours. Therefore,
Beauregard again feared that the element of surprise had been lost and
recommended withdrawal to Corinth, but Johnston again declined to
consider withdrawal.
The attack was early in the morning
At 6 o'clock on the morning of
April 6, Johnston's army was drawn up in battle order on both sides of
the road from Corinth. In fact, the army had spent the entire night in
bivouac just 2 miles (3 km) from the Union camp without being detected.
The advance and attack at dawn occurred with almost total strategic and
tactical surprise. The Union Army had almost no patrols out to give a
warning. Grant telegraphed the evening before to Halleck: "I can hardly
imagine that a major attack is in the offing, but will be ready if such
a thing should occur". Grant was not as prepared as he claimed. Sherman,
who was Grant's senior commander in the camp, did not believe that the
Confederate army was anywhere near, and dismissed the possibility of an
attack from the south, expecting that Johnston would eventually attack
from the west, from Purdy. Early in the morning, General Benjamin
Prentiss had sent the 25th Missouri Infantry Regiment forward on a
reconnaissance, and they engaged advanced Confederate posts at 5.15. The
fierce fighting that followed helped somewhat to get the Union troops
into better positions, but the leadership of the Union Army did nothing
to ensure proper preparation.
The Confederate troops did not line
up according to a plan of battle that Johnston and Beauregard had agreed
upon, and this meant that the attack was not entirely effective.
Johnston had telegraphed to President Jefferson Davis that the attack
would be made with "Polk on the left, Bragg in the center and Hardee on
the right with Breckinridge in reserve." His strategy was to strengthen
the attack on the right flank to prevent the Union army from reaching
back to the Tennessee River, which was both its line of supply and route
of retreat. He ordered Beauregard to remain in the rear and see to it
that men and supplies were sent forward, while he himself rode to the
front and led the attacking forces. He thus practically handed over the
command of the battle to Beauregard, who had a different idea, to attack
in three waves and push the Union army directly east into the river.
Hardee and Bragg's corps began the attack with their divisions on a line
nearly 3 miles long. As the units advanced, they became mixed up and
difficult to control. Corps commanders attacked in line and without
reserves. Artillery could not be concentrated and thus produce a
breakthrough. At 7:30 a.m. Beauregard, from his position behind the
front, ordered Polk and Breckenridge's corps forward to the left and
right of line, reducing their effectiveness. The result was that the
attack was carried out as if it were a frontal assault by a single
unified force, which lacked both the depth and weight needed to force
success. Command and control in modern form was lost at the start of the
first attack.
Despite some limitations, the attack was fierce, and some of the many inexperienced Union soldiers in Grant's new army fled to the river for safety. Others fought well but were forced to retreat hard pressed and tried to form new defensive lines. Many regiments broke up completely, and companies and platoons that remained on the battlefield attached themselves to other units. At this period Sherman, who had been so lax in preparing for the battle, became one of its most important elements. He appeared everywhere along his lines and inspired his immature recruits to resist the initial attack despite heavy casualties on both sides. He received two minor wounds and had three horses shot away from under him. Historian James M. McPherson describes the battle as a turning point in Sherman's life that helped him become one of the Union's best generals. Sherman's division took the brunt of the initial attack, but despite heavy fire against its positions and a crumbling right wing, it stubbornly fought on. The Union army was slowly pushed back and fell back to a position behind Shiloh Church. McClernand's division temporarily stabilized the position. On the whole, Johnston's forces made steady progress until noon, overrunning the Union positions one by one.
General Grant was this morning about 10 miles downriver on a gunboat at Savannah. On April 4, he had been injured when his horse fell and he became trapped under it. He was recovering and could not move without crutches. He heard the sound of artillery and set off for the battlefield, which he reached at about 8.30. He worked feverishly to bring up nearby reinforcements: Bull Nelson's division, which was across the river, and Lew Wallace's division from Crump's Landing. These reinforcements did not arrive quickly, reportedly because of some decisions made by Wallace.
Wallace's group had been left as a reserve near Crump's landing at a location at Stoney Lonesome behind Union lines. When the Confederate army attacked, Grant sent orders to Wallace to bring his forces forward to support Sherman. Wallace took a different path than Grant expected (he later claimed that Grant's order had been ambiguous). By the time he reached the spot where he figured Sherman would be, Sherman had meanwhile been pushed back. Not only that, the front had moved so far that Wallace was now behind the advancing Confederate forces. A messenger arrived with a message from Grant that he wondered where Wallace was and why he had not arrived at Pittsburg Landing, where the Union was holding out. Wallace was confused. He felt confident that he could launch an attack from where he stood and hit the Confederate army in the back. After the war, he claimed that his division could have attacked and defeated the Confederate army if his advance had not been slowed. Still, he decided to march back to Stoney Lonesome. Instead of turning around, he marched in a circle so that the order of battle was the same but reversed. Wallace marched back to Stoney Lonesome and then to Pittsburg Landing, arriving at Grant's position around 6:30–7 p.m., when the battle was practically over. Grant was not pleased, and his comments on Wallace's battle report were sufficiently negative to seriously damage Wallace's military career.
Around. 9.00 established men from Prentiss' and W.H.L. Wallace's divisions a position which was called Hvepsereden (Hornet's Nest) in a field along a road which is now popularly called the hollow road, although there is little in the topography to justify the name. The Confederate army attacked the position for several hours rather than simply bypassing it, and suffered heavy casualties in these attacks. The Union forces to the right and left of the Wasp's Nest were pushed back, and Prentiss's position became a salient on the line. Coordination in the position was poor and units retreated based solely on the decision of their own commanders. This tendency grew when Wallace was mortally wounded while in command of the largest body of troops in the position. Regiments disbanded and companies fell apart. However, it was not until the attackers mustered over 50 guns to shell the position that they succeeded in encircling it, and the Wasp's Nest fell after holding out for 7 hours. A large proportion of the survivors were captured, but their sacrifice gave Grant time to establish a final line of defense near Pittsburg Landing.
Part of the problem with dealing with the Wasp's Nest revolved around another setback for the South. Johnston had been mortally wounded about 14.30 while leading an attack on the Union's left wing. He had sent his personal doctor away to attend to some wounded soldiers, and while the doctor was gone, he bled from a wound in his knee, although it did not look serious at first. This was a serious loss for the Southern States. Jefferson Davis considered Albert Sidney Johnston the most effective general the Confederacy had. (It was two months before Robert E. Lee emerged as the best Confederate general.) Beauregard assumed command, but from his position behind the army he could only have a vague idea of how the forces were positioned at the front. He ordered Johnston's body to be covered to avoid damaging morale and then continued the attacks on the Wasp's Nest. This was possibly a tactical error. The Union flanks were slowly withdrawn to form a semicircle around Pittsburg Landing, and if Beauregard had concentrated his forces against these flanks, he might have defeated the Union army and then taken the Wasp's Nest at his convenience.
The Union flanks were pushed back, but not decisively. Hardee and Polk caused Sherman and McClernand on the Union right to retreat toward Pittsburg Landing, leaving the right flank of the Wasp's Nest open. Immediately after Johnston's death, Breckinridge with his corps, which had been in reserve, attacked the extreme Union left and drove back the undermanned brigade under Colonel David Stuart. This opened a possible route behind the Union line and the Tennessee River. However, he stopped to regroup and exhale and then chose to follow the sound of cannons in the direction of the Wasp's Nest, thereby losing an opportunity. When the Wasp's Nest fell, the rest of the Union forces established a solid three-mile (5 km) front around Pittsburg Landing, which stretched from the Tennessee River and north along the river road, thereby keeping a path open for Lew Wallace's delayed division. Sherman commanded the right wing, McClernand the center, and on the left were the remnants of W.H.L. Wallace's, Hurlbut's, and Stuart's divisions mingled with thousands of soldiers who had deserted their units. where they crowded together on the hills. One brigade of Buell's army, Brigadier General Jacob Ammen's brigade of Bull Nelson's division, arrived in time to be ferried across the river and placed at the end of the left wing. The defensive line contained more than 50 guns in addition to the naval guns on the river (the gunboats USS' Lexington and USS Tyler). A final attack with two brigades led by Brigadier General Withers attempted to break through the front but was repulsed. Beauregard called off a further attempt after 1 p.m. 18, when the sun went down. The Confederate army's plan had failed. They had pushed Grant east to a defensive position on the river, not pushed him west into the swamps.
The evening of April 6 was a depressing end to the first day of one
of the bloodiest battles in American history. Desperate screams from
wounded and dying soldiers in no man's land could be heard throughout
the night in both camps. A thunderstorm passed over the area, and the
rhythmic shelling from the Union gunboats made the night a miserable
experience for both sides. A famous story sums up Grant's attitude to
temporary setbacks and his penchant for offensive action. Sherman met
Grant, who was sitting under a tree sheltering from the rain. He smoked
a cigar as he pondered today's losses and planned for tomorrow. Sherman
remarked, “Well Grant, it's been a bloody day, hasn't it?”. Grant looked
up: "Yes", he replied and exhaled smoke, "but tomorrow we will beat
them".
Beauregard sent a telegram to President Davis in which he
wrote “A complete victory”, and later he admitted: “I thought I had
General Grant right where I wanted him and could beat him decisively the
next day”. Many of his men were in high spirits after capturing Union
camps, taking thousands of prisoners and many tons of supplies.
However, Grant had good reason to be optimistic, as Lew Wallace's
division and 15,000 men from Don Carlos Buell's army began arriving
during the evening and Buell's troops were fully in place by 11:00 p.m.
4 in the morning in time to be able to turn the tide the next day.
Beauregard caused considerable controversy among historians with his
decision to halt the attacks at sunset. Braxton Bragg and Sidney
Johnston's son Colonel William Preston Johnston were among those who
lamented the so-called "lost opportunity at Shiloh". Beauregard did not
come to the front to assess the strength of the Union lines, but
remained at Shiloh Church. He also disregarded intelligence reports from
Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest (and boasts from the captured General
Prentiss)) that Buell's men would cross the river and reinforce Grant.
In support of his decision serves that his men were completely
exhausted. Less than an hour of daylight remained, and Grant's
superiority in artillery was formidable. He had also received a dispatch
from Brigadier General Benjamin Hardin Helm in northern Alabama, which
indicated that Buell was marching in the direction of Decatur, Alabama,
and not toward Pittsburg Landing.
On April 7, the combined Union army numbered 45,000 men. The
Confederate army had suffered heavy losses in the first days, upwards of
8,500, but due to stragglers and desertions, their commanders reported
that there were actually no more than 20,000. After the war, Buell
questioned this figure. He claimed there had been 28,000. The
Confederates had retreated south to Prentiss's and Sherman's camps, and
Polk's corps retreated all the way back to their bivouac from the night
before 4 miles (6.5 km) southwest of Pittsburg Landing. A battle line
was not established and few or no units received new ammunition. The
soldiers were preoccupied with finding food, water and shelter before a
much-needed night's sleep.
Beauregard, unaware that he was now
outnumbered, planned to continue the attack and drive Grant into the
river. To his surprise, the Union army began to advance in a massive
counterattack at dawn. Grant and Buell launched their attacks
separately, coordination occurring only at the divisional level. Lew
Wallace's division was the first to engage on the extreme right of the
Union line. It crossed the Tilghman Branch at about 7 and drove back
Colonel Preston Pond's brigade. On Wallace's left were the remnants of
Sherman's division, and then McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's
divisions (now commanded by Col. James Tuttle). Buell's divisions
continued the line to the left: Bull Nelsons, Crittendens, and McCooks.
The Confederate army was so badly mixed up that there was not much
cohesion above the brigade level. It took two hours to find General Polk
and bring his division up from its bivouac in the southwest. By 10
o'clock Beauregard had stabilized his front with the corps commanders
from left to right: Bragg, Polk, Breckinridge, and Hardee.
On the
Union left, Nelson's division led the advance down the Corinth and
Hamburg-Savannah roads, closely followed by Crittenden's and McCook's
divisions. After hard fighting, Crittenden's division recaptured the
Wasp's Nest late in the morning, but Crittenden and Nelson were both
driven back by determined counterattacks from Breckinridge. The Union
right made steady progress, driving Bragg and Polk southward. When
Crittenden and McCook resumed their attack, Breckenridge was forced to
fall back, and by noon Beauregard's line was parallel to the
Hamburg-Purdy road.
In the early afternoon, Beauregard launched a
series of counterattacks from the area of Shiloh Church to secure
control of the road to Corinth. The Union army was temporarily driven
back by these attacks at Water Oaks Pond. Crittenden, reinforced by
Tuttle, took the junction of the Hamburg-Purdy and East Corinth roads
and drove the Confederate troops into Prentiss's old camp. Nelson
resumed his attack and took the heights above Locust Grove Branch in the
late afternoon. Beauregard's final counterattack was hit in the flank
and thrown back as Grant moved James C. Veatch's brigade forward.
Beauregard was aware that he had lost the initiative. Ammunition and
supplies were running low, and over 10,000 men were killed, wounded or
missing, so he knew he could do no more. He retreated from Shiloh Church
under cover of Breckingridge's 5,000 men and with all guns placed at the
church and on the crest of the hill south of Shiloh Branch. These forces
held the Union forces on the Corinth road until 17, when the southern
army began an orderly retreat towards Corinth. The exhausted Union
soldiers did not pursue much further than Sherman's and Prentiss'
original camps. Lew Wallace's division continued beyond Shiloh Branch,
but failing to receive support from other units, they called off the
pursuit after dark and returned to Sherman's camp. The battle was over.
For a long time afterward, Grant and Buell argued over Grant's
decision not to launch an immediate pursuit since there was an hour of
daylight left. Grant pointed to the exhaustion of the troops, although
the troops on the other side were at least as tired. Part of Grant's
hesitation to act could be due to the unusual command relationship he
had with Buell. Although Grant held the highest rank and was technically
in command of both armies, Buell made it abundantly clear that for the
two days he was acting independently.
On April 8, Grant sent Sherman south along the Corinth Road to
investigate whether the Confederate army had retreated or was simply
regrouping. Grant's army did not have sufficiently large cavalry units
available, although they would have been better for reconnaissance and
pursuit of a retreating army. Sherman marched off with two brigades of
his division, along with two battalions of cavalry and Thomas J. Wood's
division of Buell's army. 10 km southwest of Pittsburg Landing they came
across a clearing where a substantial camp had been set up, which, among
other things, included a field hospital. The camp was protected by 300
cavalry under Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest. The road leading to the
clearing was covered with felled trees for a length of 200 metres.
As a chain of riflemen from the 77th Ohio infantry fought their way
through the felled trees, Forrest's cavalry charged, and a wild melee
ensued with Confederate troops firing shotguns and revolvers and
brandishing sabers, which had nearly resulted in Sherman's been
captured. As Colonel Jesse Hildebrand's brigade began to form line, the
Confederates began to retreat, and Forrest, who was well ahead of his
men, only realized at the last moment that he was alone. Sherman's men
shouted: "Kill him, kill him and his horse" A Union soldier pressed his
musket into Forrest's side, fired and hit him with a bullet that went in
over the hip and out through the back. Although seriously wounded, he
managed to stay on the horse and escape. He survived both his wounds and
the war.
Union forces lost about 100 men, most as prisoners
during Forrest's attack. After capturing the Confederate field hospital,
Sherman encountered the rear of Breckinridge's covering force and,
finding that the enemy showed no sign of resuming the attacks, retreated
to camp.
Immediately after the battle, newspapers in the Northern States
strongly criticized Grant for his conduct during the battle on April 6.
Journalists, many of them far removed from the battle, spread a story
that Grant had been drunk, and claimed, quite untruthfully, that it had
been the cause of many of his men being bayoneted in their tents, as a
result of the camp was not secured against attack. Although the Union
had won, it went beyond Grant's reputation in the public opinion of the
Northern states. Many credited Buell with taking control of the Union
forces and leading them to victory on April 7. The White House was
inundated with demands that Grant be removed. Abraham Lincoln responded
with one of his most famous quotes about Grant: "I can't do without him,
he fights". Sherman became the hero of the moment. His firmness during
the attack made up for his earlier melancholy and his mistakes before
the battle.
Today, Grant is recognized for his ability to keep a
cool head under stress and for his ability to see the bigger tactical
picture, which ultimately resulted in the Union victory on the second
day.
However, Grant's career was briefly derailed after the
Battle of Shiloh. Henry W. Halleck rallied and reorganized his armies
and took the opportunity to demote Grant to the insignificant position
of his second in command.
In late April and May, Union armies
under Halleck's personal leadership advanced very slowly to Corinth and
captured it, while an amphibious force on the Mississippi River
destroyed Confederate naval forces on the river and captured Memphis.
Halleck was promoted to commander-in-chief of all Union armies, and
with his departure for the East, Grant regained command. Grant pushed
down the Mississippi River to capture Vicksburg. After Vicksburg
surrendered and Port Hudson fell in the summer of 1863, the Mississippi
River was under Union control and the Confederacy cut in half. Command
of the Confederate army passed to Braxton Bragg, who was promoted to
full general on April 6, 1862. At the end of the year, he led an
unsuccessful invasion of Kentucky, culminating in his retreat after the
Battle of Perryville.
The two-day battle of Shiloh was the
bloodiest in American history up to that time. It resulted in the defeat
of the Confederate army and thwarted Johnston's plans to prevent the two
Northern armies from uniting. Union losses were 13,047 (1,754 killed,
8,408 wounded, and 2,885 captured and missing); Grant's army bore the
brunt of the two days' losses with 1,513 killed, 6,601 wounded, and
2,830 missing or captured. Confederate losses were 10,699 (1,728 dead,
8,012 wounded and 959 missing or captured).
This total of 23,746
was greater than the total American casualties during the entire
American Revolutionary War, War of 1812, and Mexican-American War
combined. Grant realized that his belief that a major battle could end
the war would probably not be fulfilled. The war would continue with
great loss of life and material until the Confederacy collapsed or the
Union split. Grant also learned a valuable personal lesson about being
prepared that he remembered most times throughout the rest of the war.