Location: Adams County, PA Map
Area: 3,965 acres (16.05 km2)
Gettysburg National Military Park is located in Adams County, Pennsylvania in USA. It covers an area of 3,965 acres (16.05 km2) of a former battle site that became the famous as the largest engagement between the North/ Union and the South/ Confederate armies during the Civil War. Over 43,000 artifacts can be found in the National Park Museum and visitor center of the National Park. Today, the Gettysburg National Military Park has more wooded land than in 1863, as well as more roads for tourists. There are efforts to bring the park back to a state similar to that of the civil war period.
Gettysburg National Military Park, 1195 Baltimore
Pike, ☎ +1 717 334-1124. 6AM-10PM. Gettysburg is the site of one of
the most important battles of the American Civil War, and the
largest land battle ever fought in North America. This National Park
Service controls most of the area surrounding the small town and
preserves the historic battle field. The museum and visitor center
are run by the Gettysburg Foundation, a non-profit partner of the
National Park Service at Gettysburg. The visitor center houses the
museum collection as well as special exhibits from across the
country and the fully restored Gettysburg Cyclorama, a must-see for
any visit. You can also hire a very knowledgeable licensed
battlefield guide here. You can also purchase tour tickets for the
Eisenhower Farm. $12.50. The surrounding military park is free and
open to the public. At the Visitor Center, you begin your visit to
Gettysburg National Military Park. Here you will find information
with the best tips for a successful trip in and around Gettysburg.
The Visitors' Center also features the film A New Birth of Freedom ,
which tells the story of the battle told by Oscar winner Morgan
Freeman. The cost of the project amounted to 135 million US dollars.
Jennie Wade House, 548 Baltimore St, ☎ +1 717-334-4100. 9AM-5PM.
The only Gettysburg citizen killed during the Battle of Gettysburg
was 20 year old Jennie Wade, fiancée of Corporal “Jack” Skelly. The
old McClellan Home, now the Jennie Wade House and Museum, with but
few minor changes and repairs, remains much as Jennie Wade must have
known it more than 100 years ago. The walls of the old house, which
lived through the Battle of Gettysburg and witnessed the tragic
death of Jennie Wade, tell the story of the building and of those in
it during the Great Battle.
The Gettysburg Heritage Center,
297 Steinwehr Ave, ☎ +1 717-334-6245. Daily March—December 9am—5pm.
Extended Spring & Summer hours 9am—7 pm. Last tour begins 45 minutes
before closing. Presents the entire story of the Civil War era and
the Battle of Gettysburg with remarkable realism. Learn the causes,
effects and significant personalities that shaped the Civil War and
as a result, ultimately, American history. Throughout five hallways
of scenes, the museum recreates history with life-sized dioramas of
the Civil War. Visitors complete a self-guided museum tour that
begins with the economical, social, and political causes of the war
and ends with the untimely assassination of President Abraham
Lincoln. Following the self-guided tour, visitors enter into the
internationally acclaimed, digitally enhanced Battleroom Auditorium.
Amidst the sounds of thunderous battle cries and bullets, visitors
will witness a life-sized recreation of the Battle of Gettysburg.
Discover how a small town in rural Pennsylvania became known for one
of the bloodiest battles in American history. An animated Abraham
Lincoln delivering the immortal Gettysburg Address follows the
battle recreation. $5.50 adults / $3 Youth (ages 6 — 17) / 5 & under
- free.
The
civil war was the result of years of division of the nation on
religious, economic, political and social issues. The soldiers were
mostly veterans, their backgrounds for participating in the war were
very different (e.g. personal beliefs, patriotism,...). Many outside
civilians were affected by the battle, such as helping the wounded and
burying the dead. Landscaped areas were turned into battlefields. In the
Gettysburg Address, President Abraham Lincoln called attention to the
losses and horrors of the war and appealed to the newfound freedom that
remains ingrained in American memories to this day. The mass graves in
the National Military Park commemorate people's individual experiences
of war. The monuments created a bridge between the citizens and the
battlefields of American history.
History of the park
Before
becoming a state facility, the park was administered first by local
citizens and then by the state of Pennsylvania. Thirty years later, a
desire for reconciliation arose between the northern and southern states
after the American Civil War. In 1895, Congress made Gettysburg Park the
third largest military park in America. The aim of the park was to
preserve and protect the monuments, as well as the vegetation and
wildlife. The park also offered the opportunity for historical research.
In 1933, the National Park Service (NPS) took over management of the
park. In 1990, Congress established some rules for the park. The aim was
to point out the consequences of the civil war and to place the war in a
larger historical context. In 1896 the Secretary of War took over
management of the park.
National Park Museum and Visitor Center
The museum
and visitor center were established in 2008 in cooperation with the
National Park Service and the Gettysburg Foundation. On 2044 m2 (22,000
sq ft) relics of the Battle of Gettysburg and the Civil War are
presented in exhibitions and the people who acted at that time are
brought closer to the visitors. The visit to Gettysburg National
Military Park begins at the Visitor Center. Here you will find
information with the best tips for a successful trip in and around
Gettysburg. Also in the visitor center is the film A New Birth of
Freedom, which tells the story of the battle and is narrated by Oscar
winner Morgan Freeman. The cost of the project amounted to 135 million
US dollars.
George Rosensteel Collection
Gettysburg Park is
home to the George Rosensteel Collection, which is one of the world's
largest collections of Civil War relics. The collection was bequeathed
to the Rosensteel family and includes a variety of weapons, uniforms and
battle remains.
Cyclorama
The David Wills House is the
building where Abraham Lincoln completed his famous Gettysburg Address.
Attorney David Wills was the owner of the house and organizer of the
dedication of the military cemetery, which took place on November 19,
1863. On February 12, 2009, on the 200th anniversary of Abraham
Lincoln's birth, the David Wills House was opened to the public. In the
museum you can visit the premises where Lincoln prepared for the speech.
military cemetery
The Soldiers' National Cemetery was originally
laid out by local people on the site where President Abraham Lincoln
delivered his November 19, 1863 speech. On March 25, 1864, he was
adopted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly. The cemetery, which is
open year-round and has gravestones arranged by state, serves as the
final resting place for soldiers who died in the Battle of Gettysburg.
Today it is managed by the National Park Service.
Both the design and the location of the 90 or so memorials erected in memory of the fallen soldiers had to be approved by the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association (GBMA). The two oldest sculptures - the Soldiers' Cemetery Monument and the 20th Maine Infantry Monument - are located in the Soldiers' National Cemetery and differ greatly not only in their size and shape, but also in their importance. The memorials were built at the request of various groups of war veterans, but were funded by the Pennsylvania state government. Among the most significant statues are the High Water Mark of the Rebellion Monument and the Eternal Light Peace Memorial, symbolic of the country's reunification after the war. At the last major commemoration in 1938, which was attended by more than 250,000 people, then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt said: “All of them we honor, not asking under which flag they fought then – thankful that they stand together under one flag now.
Living History
The Living History program takes
place every weekend from April to October, bringing history back to
life. Reenactment groups camp there in period uniforms and demonstrate
weapons and tactics used by fighting armies during the Civil War.
Ranger program
The Ranger Program offers a variety of free,
ranger-led battlefield reconnaissance tours. McMillan Woods Youth
Campground is open April through October and provides a supervised
campground and activities. Horseback riding on various trails is offered
to visitors to the area.
Dedication Day
November 19 marks the
anniversary of the dedication of the Gettysburg War Cemetery, where
Abraham Lincoln gave his famous speech. The cemetery is now world
famous. Therefore, numerous events take place every year on this day,
the Dedication Day. The highlight is a military parade in period
uniforms, which has been held on the Saturday before the anniversary
since 1946. On November 18, 2017, the day before the 154th anniversary
of Lincoln's speech, the parade was marred by bomb threats and was held
under increased police protection. The reason for taking the threats
seriously was the dispute over the removal of statues of Confederate
generals from the Civil War, which culminated in a demonstration in
Charlottesville in August 2017.
After the victory at Chancellorsville, General Lee
proposed to President Jefferson Davis that he go north and invade
Pennsylvania. This would give the Army of Northern Virginia the capital,
Washington, D.C. and threaten the cities of Baltimore and Philadelphia.
The Army of the Potomac would thus be forced to follow Lee north. Major
General Joseph Hooker, commander in chief of the Army of the Potomac,
was to attack the Army of Northern Virginia on terrain chosen by Lee.
Lee wanted to beat Hooker there again, but this time in Union territory.
Other goals were to prevent troops from the eastern theater from
reinforcing Ulysses S. Grant's siege of Vicksburg, Mississippi, and to
force the Union to withdraw troops from the coastal areas of the
Carolinas and Georgia. Lee rejected a reinforcement of General Joseph E.
Johnston, commander of the Confederate western theater of war, to
relieve the pressure on Vicksburg, as well as the proposal to reinforce
the Confederate Army of Tennessee and to crush the Union Army of the
Cumberland in Tennessee. The President and Cabinet except the Postmaster
General approved Lee's proposal, and even Lt. Gen. James Longstreet,
commanding general of I Corps, accepted the plan.
The Army of
Northern Virginia marched north under the protection of the Blue Ridge
Mountains. The cavalry under Major General J.E.B. Stuart was tasked with
concealing the movement while simultaneously elucidating the Army of the
Potomac's movements. The largest cavalry battle on the American
continent took place at Brandy Station on June 9th. Further cavalry
battles near Aldie and Middleburg in Virginia followed. Stuart then
circled the Army of the Potomac to the east.
After the Second
Battle of Winchester, Lee was able to cross the Potomac unmolested and
advance to the Susquehanna. His army, approximately 75,000 strong, was
spread out in a wide arc on both sides of the South Mountain. The I
Corps under James Longstreet had the Chambersburg area, the II Corps
under Richard S. Ewell the area south of Carlisle and the III Corps.
reached the Cashtown area under Ambrose P. Hill. Stuart's cavalry
division was east of the Army of the Potomac, so Lee had no accurate
information about the opposing army's movements since June 24. On June
28, when Lee learned from scouts from Longstreet's corps that the Army
of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac north, he ordered the Army of
Northern Virginia to assemble in the Cashtown area.
US President Abraham Lincoln appointed Major General
George Gordon Meade as commander in chief of the Army of the Potomac on
June 28. Meade intended to stop the Army of Northern Virginia before it
crossed the Susquehanna and to entice General Lee to attack the Army of
the Potomac, which had scouted defensive positions along Pipe Creek in
northern Maryland. However, since Lee had abandoned his intention to
cross the Susquehanna, Meade moved a corps to the Gettysburg area.
J. Johnston Pettigrew's brigade of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division
had approached Gettysburg on June 30 in search of food and shoes.
However, Union cavalry under the command of Brigadier General John F.
Buford was already in the city. This was able to hold the city because
Pettigrew did not accept the battle and retreated to the west.
Lieutenant General Hill ordered Heth to conduct a force reconnaissance
against Gettysburg the next day, believing that the forces there were
only Pennsylvania militia. In doing so, Hill did not violate Lee's
instructions not to engage in any major battles until the Army of
Northern Virginia assembled.
The brigades of Brigadier Generals James J. Archer and
Joseph R. Davis - a nephew of the President of the Confederate States -
reached the ridges in front of the city to the northwest around 07:30
a.m. Expecting little resistance, Heth deployed the two brigades on
either side of the Chambersburg Pike and marched toward the town.
However, Brigadier General Buford had not remained idle during the night
and was defending along McPherson Ridge with the dismounted horsemen -
armed with Sharps carbines - from his two brigades and a horse artillery
battery. Buford managed to hold off the superior southerners for more
than two hours before he had to retreat to Gettysburg.
In those
minutes, the first two brigades of the 1st Division of the I Corps of
the Army of the Potomac appeared and relieved Buford's cavalrymen. The
commanding general, Major General John F. Reynolds, instructed the
brigade commanders on horseback at McPherson Ridge and was fatally
wounded. Reynolds had previously appointed the commanding generals of
the following corps, the XI. and III., instructed to reach the city with
their troops as quickly as possible.
The 1st Division of the I
Corps, whose leadership had now been taken over by Major General Abner
Doubleday, managed to hold off the Confederates until around 2:30 p.m.,
with heavy losses on both sides. In the meantime, the first brigades of
the XI Corps under Major General Oliver O. Howard had reached Gettysburg
and taken up positions on the right of the I Corps to the northwest and
north.
By this time, Heth had introduced the division's other two
brigades into the fray. Also there was the 26th North Carolina Regiment,
with 820 men the strongest in the Army of Northern Virginia, which had
212 men at the end of the first day and 118 at the end of the battle.
Heth himself was shot in the head and remained incapacitated for the
rest of the battle. The division was taken over by Brigadier General
Pettigrew.
Lieutenant General Hill had meanwhile introduced Major
General William D. Pender's division into the battle, so that the
Union's I Corps had to retreat to the city via Seminary Ridge. Even
before this attack began, the divisions of Major Generals Robert E.
Rodes and Jubal Early of the II Corps under Lieutenant General Ewell,
coming from the north, had attacked the I and XI regiments that were
still in position. Corps of the Army of the Potomac attacked at Barlow
Knoll.
When the Union positions finally collapsed to the north
and west of the city, Major General Howard ordered a retreat to Cemetery
Hill south of the city. When he reached Gettysburg, he had already
ordered Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr's division to hold this
height at all costs. This made it possible to stop movements, some of
which were escapes, and to reorganize the troops.
Lee had reached
the battlefield by 2:30 p.m. and recognized the defensive potential for
the Union of the heights south of the city. He therefore called for A.P.
Hill to continue the hitherto successful attack and ordered Ewell to
take Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill if that was feasible - "if
practicable". However, Hill was unable to continue the attack as his
troops had suffered heavy casualties and were low on ammunition. The
third division of the II Corps would not reach the area west of
Gettysburg until evening.
Ewell did nothing to create the
conditions for the attack. But without these requirements, storming the
two hills was simply not possible. Ewell carefully reviewed the "if
practicable" directive and decided that an attack was not possible,[15]
thereby wasting the opportunity to drive the Army of the Potomac from
Culps and Cemetery Hill. Alleged sightings of US troops on York Pike, in
Ewell's rear and flank, also caused confusion among the Confederate
leadership. These turned out to be pointless, but resulted in two of
Ewell's brigades being temporarily assigned to protect against the
alleged threat.
25,000 Confederate and 18,000 Union soldiers
faced each other on July 1st. Lee had achieved his first major success.
In the afternoon he met with the commanding general of his I Corps,
Lieutenant General Longstreet, whose first division would not arrive in
the Gettysburg area until mid-morning the next day after a march of
around 28 km. Despite Longstreet's other suggestions, Lee decided to
resume the battle on the wings the next day.
During the night and morning of July 2, most of both
armies' infantry divisions reached the battlefield, only Longstreet's
3rd Division under Major General George Pickett would not arrive until
late in the afternoon.
Major General Meade defended with the XII
Corps on Culps Hill, to the left with the remnants of the I and to the
Little Round Top.
Lee's operational plan that day called for
attacks on both wings of the Army of the Potomac. Longstreet was to
attack the left wing astride the Emmitsburg Road to the northeast with
three divisions, including Anderson's division from Hill's III Corps.
Hill would also threaten the center of the Union lines and ensure that
the Army of the Potomac could not move troops from there to the wings.
Ewell's task was to occupy the right wing with two divisions and to
attack when a "favorable opportunity" arose. Lacking accurate
intelligence due to the continued absence of Stuart's cavalry corps,
Longstreet's left division under Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws attacked
Sickles' III Corps head-on rather than the Union's left flank.
Sickles had taken up positions west of Cemetery Ridge on his own
initiative because the terrain there was somewhat elevated. He wanted to
avoid being exposed to deadly artillery fire again like at
Chancellorsville when he had to abandon the high ground, the “Hazel
Grove”. As a result of this advance, however, Sickles overstretched the
positions of the two divisions of the III. Corps. As Meade Sickles in
the afternoon with the words
“General Sickles, this is in some
respects higher ground than that of the rear, but there is still higher
in front of you, and if you keep on advancing you will constantly find
higher ground all the way to the mountains!”
(German: "General
Sickles, this is in some ways higher ground than that behind you, but
there is even higher ground in front of you, and as you go further you
will find higher ground all the way to the mountains!")
However,
it was too late to change positions again. Meade ordered the Army of the
Potomac's engineer leader, Brigadier General Governor Kemble Warren, to
scout suitable positions behind Sickles' corps. Recognizing the
opportunities that the two Round Tops would offer, Warren recommended
that the commanding general of the V Corps, Maj. Gen. George Sykes,
immediately send troops there to avert disaster for the entire Army of
the Potomac. Sykes responded immediately and ordered the corps' 1st
Division to the tops.
Longstreet should attack as early as possible;
However, the start of the attack was delayed because Longstreet had to
wait for a brigade to arrive and an observation station on Little Round
Top was discovered during the approach. In order to remain undetected,
the troops had to go back. When Major General John B. Hood recognized
Sickles' positions around 4 p.m., Hood wanted to change the plan of
operations and attack north east of the Round Tops, which Longstreet
refused. Finally, at around 4:30 p.m., Hood attacked the two Tops and
Devils Den on his own initiative.
After taking Devils Den, the
Alabama Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Evander McIvor
Laws, supported by two Texas regiments from Jerome Bonaparte Robertson's
brigade, attacked toward the Tops. The 15th Alabama Regiment quickly
reached the heights of Big Round Top and immediately began approaching
Little Round Top when it came under murderous fire. The 20th Maine
Regiment from Colonel Strong Vincent's brigade had arrived on the hill
just ten minutes earlier. The commander of the 15th Alabama Regiment,
Colonel William C. Oates, recognized the importance of the Little Round
Top and repeatedly tried to bypass the position of the 20th Maine
Regiment under Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain on the right, but
failed. When the 20th Maine finally ran out of ammunition, Chamberlain
ordered a bayonet charge that drove the 15th Alabama back to its
original positions. Little by little, more units from the 1st Division
of the V Corps arrived and the situation at the tops was stabilized.
Hood's attack at Devils Den was costly but successful, but could not be
pushed further towards the tops.
After Hood's brigades took
Devils Den around 5:00 p.m., Law's division attacked the III. Corps,
which had meanwhile been reinforced by brigades from the V Corps,
stopped at a wheat field and a peach orchard. The Union units were
pushed out of the wheat field to the east around 5:30 p.m. At the same
time, the Confederates managed to break into the plantation. The troops
of the III. and V Corps were in dissolution and, after heavy losses,
fled towards Cemetery Ridge north of the Tops, the area Sickles had
abandoned at midday because of the 'high ground' at the peach orchard.
A reinforcement from the II Corps, Brigadier General John C.
Caldwell's division, commanded by Meade, reached the battle area around
6:00 p.m. and managed to briefly stop the Confederate corps' attack. The
Confederates attacked again through the wheat field at about 7:30 p.m.
and were again repelled by a counterattack at the northern end of Little
Round Top. Anderson's third division from A.P. prepared for the attack.
Hill's corps began the attack north of the peach orchard against the
right flank of Sickle's corps around 6:00 p.m. The two Union brigades
deployed there had to move away. This evasive movement was the trigger
for the collapse of the entire right wing of the III. Corps.
To
allow time to prepare defenses along Cemetery Ridge, II Corps Commanding
General Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock ordered the 1st Minnesota
Regiment to halt the attacking Confederates by counterattacking. Despite
the overwhelming superiority of the Southerners, the regiment took to
the field and within a few minutes lost 224 of 262 men, suffering the
highest percentage loss ever suffered by a US Army regiment. Wilcox’s
Southern brigade was stopped. However, the other two brigades deployed
on the left wing of Anderson's division quickly found the gap left by
the collapse and pushed toward Cemetery Ridge. For a short time, General
Meade and his staff were the only Union defenders there. Whether the
southerners reached the top of Cemetery Ridge is historically
controversial - but there is much to suggest this. However, Brigadier
General Ambrose R. Wright was unable to hold the ridge because he
received no reinforcements. The brigades deployed on Wright's left
advanced only hesitantly or stood still. One of the brigade commanders
even ignored Anderson's explicit order to proceed further. Eventually
Wright had to turn back onto Emmitsburg Road. The battle came to an end
across the board as darkness fell. During this attack, Major General
Pender was hit in the leg while riding off the front of his division,
which was forming up to support the attack. Pender died as a result of
the amputation. Brigadier General Lane initially took over the division,
then it was placed under the command of Major General Trimble.
One division of the I. and two divisions of the XII.
Union corps had begun fortifying Culps Hill with positions that morning.
Ewell began the ordered diversion at the same time as Longstreet's
attack at around 4:00 p.m., initially using only artillery. However,
Major General Meade was not impressed by Ewell's actions. Meade ordered
the commanding general of the XII. Corps, Major General Henry W. Slocum,
to provide his corps to support the wavering front on the army's left
wing. Slocum then withdrew all forces except Brigadier General George S.
Greene's brigade.
Ewell did not order the attack on both hills
until dusk began, around 7:00 p.m. Three brigades of Maj. Gen. Edward
“Allegheny” Johnson’s division attacked Culps Hill and Early’s division
attacked Cemetery Hill. The difficulties for the attackers lay in the
rapidly falling darkness, the rising terrain and the developed positions
that they encountered at Culps Hill.
The attacks of the two
brigades from Johnson's division attacking in the north were repelled.
Brigadier General George Hume Steuart's brigade in the south managed to
bypass the Union troops' positions to the south. Here, similar to the
20th Maine Regiment at the other end of the Army of the Potomac, the
137th New York Regiment under Colonel David Ireland defended at the far
right end of the army. The regiment managed to hold the right flank of
the army with only minor losses in terrain, despite heavy losses.
Since the troops were not used to fighting in the dark, there were
fatal incidents: The 1st North Carolina Regiment fired on the 1st
Confederate Maryland Regiment. As the remains of the XII. Corps returned
to their positions, the soldiers found them occupied by Confederates. To
put an end to this confusion and to avoid further casualties, the
division commanders on both sides ended the battle at around 11:00 p.m.
and continued fighting from the positions they had reached at daybreak.
Early's brigades managed to advance to the top of Cemetery Hill and
capture several guns. Two newly introduced Union regiments ended the
infantry's scuffle with the gun crews. The Confederate brigade
commander, Brigadier General Harry T. Hays, realized that it was no
longer possible to distinguish friend from foe. When he was also
attacked by a brigade from the II Corps, he ordered a retreat to the
foot of the hill. Rode's division was also supposed to take part in the
attack on Cemetery Hill. However, this only reached its starting
position after dark. After the fighting ended, Cemetery Hill was again
in the hands of the Army of the Potomac.
The Southerners had
missed a great opportunity at Culps Hill - the Army of the Potomac's
main line of communication ran on the Baltimore Pike, just 2,000 feet
from the positions of the 137th New York Regiment.
Stuart's
cavalry had arrived in the Gettysburg area on the afternoon of July 2nd,
but was unable to intervene in the action. Since this movement also
resulted in the remaining cavalry of the Army of the Potomac appearing
in the Gettysburg area, Johnson had to assign a brigade to combat this
new threat.
Major General Meade, after meeting with his staff and
commanding generals about the Army of the Potomac's losses, decided to
wait for Lee's attacks the next day. At the end of the meeting, Meade
warned Brigadier General John Gibbon, now commanding general of the
Union II Corps, that if Lee attacked the next day, he would do so before
Gibbon's corps. Meade said support from the V. and VI. Corps too. The
XII. Corps allowed Meade to attack the next morning to retake the lost
positions at the foot of Culp Hill.
Lee, on the other hand, was
displeased because he believed that his orders and plans had been poorly
carried out. Longstreet again proposed a strategic bypass of the Army of
the Potomac's left flank, but Lee decided to attack both flanks again
the next day, while Stuart would operate to Ewell's left and rear.
The losses for the second day are difficult to estimate because both
armies only determined their respective strengths after the end of the
battle. It is estimated that the Army of Northern Virginia suffered
losses of nearly 6,000 men, which meant losses of 30 to 40 percent for
Longstreet's divisions involved in the attack. The Army of the Potomac
lost around 9,000 men.
Lee realized early on the morning of July 3 that his
plan was unworkable - Longstreet was not yet sufficiently prepared for
the attack and Ewell was already engaged in heavy fighting at Culps
Hill. Lee's request to Ewell not to take part in the battle came too
late.
The batteries of the XII. Corps had begun to bombard
Steuart's positions for 30 minutes at dusk. However, the southerners
anticipated the subsequent planned attack. In total, Johnson's soldiers
attacked three times, but were repelled each time. The fighting ended
around 12:00 with an attack by two Union regiments, which was carried
out head-on due to misinterpretation of the attack order. The commander
of the 2nd Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Charles R. Mudge, repeated
the order and then said:
“Well, it’s murder, but it’s the order.”
During the bloody two-day fighting at Culps Hill, the Union lost
approximately 1,000 men and the Confederates 2,800 men - a fifth and a
third, respectively, of their respective manpower.
Encouraged by
the fact that the Confederate troops had almost succeeded in breaking
through to the right of the center of the Army of the Potomac the day
before, Lee decided to attack the enemy's center, altering the previous
day's plan.
At 1:00 p.m., 170 Confederate guns began a two-hour
bombardment of the artillery positions between Cemetery Hill and the
Round Tops along Cemetery Ridge. Initially, 80 guns from the Army of the
Potomac returned fire, but soon the commander of the artillery,
Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, ordered to cease fire in order to have
enough ammunition for the expected infantry attack. Although the
Confederates' fire was mostly too high due to poor visibility,
casualties on both sides were significant.
By around 3:00 p.m.
the artillery had almost exhausted itself and the infantry attack began.
Taking part in the attack, under Longstreet's leadership, were Pickett's
Division from the I Corps, as well as Pettigrew's (formerly Heth's)
Division and parts of Isaac R. Trimble's (formerly Pender's) Division
from the III. Corps A.P. Hills part. The total number of troops deployed
was approximately 12,000 men. The attack began at Seminary Ridge over a
mile wide. The brigades slowly advanced over a kilometer of open ground
east toward the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. Immediately after
crossing Seminary Ridge, the Union batteries opened fire on the
Confederate soldiers along Cemetery Ridge. In particular, the flanking
fire from Cemetery Hill and north of Little Round Top tore large gaps in
the attacking lines. When the attackers were only 1,200 feet (360 m)
away, the artillery fired grapeshot and the Union infantry joined in
with musket fire. The Confederates shortened the line to half a mile and
continued to attack. Pickett's division turned northeast. This gave the
division a flank for the Union batteries, which could now fire parallel
to the attackers' lines. Pettigrew's left flank suddenly faced a flank
attack from the 8th Ohio Regiment, which caused the brigade deployed on
the left to flee to the starting positions at Seminary Ridge.
The
attacking Confederates crowded together in the center, forming a
formation 15 to 30 men deep. At a low stone wall that formed a right
angle here, around 200 men under the leadership of Brigadier General
Lewis A. Armistead finally broke into the Union infantry positions and
reached the first artillery positions. In the counterattack, the
Confederates were thrown out of their positions again. This part of the
stone wall - called "The Angle" because of the angle - later became
known as the "High Water Mark of the Confederacy". The remaining
Confederate units and formations slowly retreated toward Seminary Ridge
as it became clear that no reinforcements were being brought in. The
entire attack, later called Pickett's Charge, lasted little more than an
hour.
When Major General Pickett reported back to Lee, he ordered
his division to prepare for a counterattack by the Army of the Potomac.
Pickett responded:
"General Lee, I have no division now."
Confederate losses were enormous - nearly 5,600 men, including all three
brigade and all 13 regimental commanders from Pickett's division.
However, the Union counterattack did not take place. Although the
Northern states' losses were significantly lower at around 1,500 men,
the fighting strength of the Army of the Potomac was also exhausted and
Meade was satisfied that he had held the positions.
Major General Stuart was to oversee the left flank of
the Army of Northern Virginia with the Confederate cavalry and cut the
main line of communication in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. Three
miles east of Gettysburg, Stuart with four brigades, approximately 3,430
cavalry with 13 guns, encountered Brigadier General David McMurtrie
Gregg's division, reinforced by Brigadier General George A. Custer's
brigade, approximately 3,250 cavalry, at about 1:00 p.m. Stuart
immediately attacked with the 1st Virginia Regiment, but was
counterattacked by the 7th Michigan Regiment under Custer's personal
leadership - "Come on, you Wolverines!" – thrown back in battle with
pistol and saber. With reinforcements, Stuart managed to put Custer's
riders to flight. Stuart ordered a renewed attack with the bulk of
Brigadier General Wade Hampton's brigade. With sabers drawn, Hampton's
riders attacked the 7th Michigan Regiment. Gregg then had Hampton's
flanks attacked. Pressed from three sides, the Confederate riders
retreated to their starting positions. The entire battle lasted
approximately 40 minutes. Although a tactical draw, the battle
represented a strategic defeat for Lee because Stuart failed to reach
the rear of the Army of the Potomac.
The Union cavalry division
under Brigadier General Hugh J. Kilpatrick attacked the positions of
Hood's division from the south on both sides of the Emmitsburg Road
around 3:00 p.m. In several waves, Kilpatrick had the cavalry regiments
attack infantry in positions initially mounted and later dismounted. The
Confederates repelled all attacks, and a lieutenant from an Alabama
regiment fired at his soldiers with the words “Cavalry, boys, cavalry!
This isn't a fight, it's a joke, give it to them!”
These
ill-conceived and executed cavalry charges marked the low point in Union
cavalry history and the last significant hostilities of the Battle of
Gettysburg.
The Army of Northern Virginia had prepared for defense
on July 4 in anticipation that Meade would attack. However, he decided
against the risk of an attack, which later brought him heavy criticism.
The Army of Northern Virginia left the positions in pouring rain
that evening and marched on the Fairfield Road to the South Mountain and
from there via the towns of Hagerstown and Williamsport, both in
Maryland, to Virginia. During the retreat, Lee's particular attention
was paid to the wounded and the supply columns, the former because of
his responsibility as a leader, the latter because they represented the
only way to enable the army to continue fighting. Lee managed to bring
the wounded, some of whom were transported under pitiful conditions -
not even straw on the wagons and too few medics to look after them -,
the approximately 5,000 prisoners, the captured weapons and ammunition
and the supply vehicles to Virginia with only minor losses.
Meade
followed Lee only half-heartedly. Even when the floodwaters of the
Potomac forced Lee to remain on the north bank, it took too long for the
Army of the Potomac to arrive. The July 14 rearguard battle at Falling
Waters in what is now West Virginia ended the Gettysburg Campaign.
Lee did not want the Battle of Gettysburg. This was
clearly reflected in his orders on July 1, in which Lee always pointed
out that Longstreet's corps was not yet available. The battle began, to
use a modern term, as an encounter. Both A.P. Both Hill and Lee, who
arrived later on site, recognized that the Army of Northern Virginia was
sufficiently superior at that moment to win the battle in their favor.
Even though the first opportunity to strike the opponent was missed, Lee
believed he could only retain the initiative by attacking.
"No,
the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there."
Reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia
Lee
had long thought about reorganizing the Army of Northern Virginia
because he found the corps too large and therefore difficult to lead. A
candidate for the post of commanding general was A.P. after the Battle
of Antietam. Hill. After Stonewall Jackson's death, the staffing
situation became scarce. The only suitable candidates left were Hill and
the recently recovered Ewell. Hill had already led a division under
Lee's direct command, Ewell had been division commander under Jackson.
Neither had ever led a corps in battle. President Davis approved the
reorganization and on May 30, Lee ordered the new organization in
Special Order No. 146. Hills III. Corps consisted of two newly formed
divisions with new division commanders and Anderson's division from
Longstreet's corps. Ewell's II Corps consisted of the divisions from
Jackson's former corps with the experienced division commanders. Due to
this profound reorganization, cooperation within the command levels of
the Northern Virginia Army was no longer as tested as before. Ewell, for
example, had previously served under Lieutenant General Jackson, who was
wounded after the Battle of Chancellorsville and died shortly afterwards
of pneumonia, and was unfamiliar with Lee's command. Lee granted the
troop commanders who reported directly to him a great deal of
discretion. Ewell couldn't do anything with this discretion. There had
been no such thing under Jackson; He gave detailed orders and left
nothing to the discretion of his troop commanders. Therefore, on July 1,
Ewell did nothing to raise the possibility of a successful attack.
However, false reconnaissance sightings also played a role, according to
which Northern troops were in Ewell's rear near York Road.
J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry was Lee's primary reconnaissance asset. On June 23rd, Lee had ordered Stuart to proceed, leaving the implementation to Stuart as he could better assess the situation. Lee had instructed Stuart to make sure to connect with the right wing of II Corps as soon as the Army of the Potomac began to move. Lee could not have foreseen that Stuart would use this opportunity to mount another hussar ride around the Army of the Potomac and disregard a clear order. Since Stuart was east of the Army of the Potomac on June 30, Lee had no insight into the enemy's behavior. The violent reconnaissance on July 1st would certainly have been avoided if Lee had suspected that the supposed Pennsylvania militia was a cavalry division, closely followed by two corps of the Army of the Potomac.
Since the fall of 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia had had to hand over several brigades to other military departments. When planning his offensive into Pennsylvania, Lee attempted to return these formations to the army. However, there were problems with President Davis and General Daniel H. Hill, who commanded the North Carolina military area. Hill proposed replacing weakened brigades from the Army of Northern Virginia with fresh brigades from the military sector. However, Lee refused except in one case and reclaimed the Ransom, Cooke, Corse and Jenkins brigades, which he viewed as merely a kind of loan. Theoretically, Hill's military area was subordinate to Lee, so that he could simply have ordered the deployment of the aforementioned brigades. Instead, he gave Hill an order with discretion. However, Hill felt threatened by the Northern troops opposing him and did not move the troops he wanted. Lee then complained to Davis on May 30 and asked to be relieved of command of Hill's military area. Ultimately, Lee received two brigades, but not the ones he had wanted: the relatively inexperienced Pettigrew and Davis brigades were placed under his command. In the meantime it also looked as if two more brigades would be placed under his command, although this was thwarted by a local Northern advance in the area of Richmond. On June 7th, Lee tried again to get at least the Cooke and Jenkins brigades under control. On the same day he pointed out that, according to northern newspaper articles, the Union troops in South Carolina were weakened and therefore suggested that General Beauregard, who was in command there, be sent with the troops thus freed up either to the west to support General Johnston or to the north to support him. However, this suggestion also had no consequences. Lee received neither the brigades he requested nor support from South Carolina for his advance into Pennsylvania. What impact this had can only be guessed at. However, the manpower of the four brigades, Cooke, Ransom, Jenkins and Corse, which Lee so often requested, was estimated to be more than 9,000 men.
Lee was with the II Corps on the evening of July 1
and, in the presence of the II Corps division commanders, asked Ewell
whether he could attack Cemetery Hill or whether he would prefer an
attack on the army's right flank. Significantly, it was not Ewell who
answered, but Jubal Early, and Ewell nodded at the answers, speechless.
No decision was made. That night Ewell rode to Lee and reported that he
saw the possibility of attacking Culps Hill. On July 2, Ewell was unable
to coordinate his corps' attacks on Culps Hill and Cemetery Hill. Lee
failed to intervene here and once again let Ewell conduct the attacks at
his discretion. Ewell did not use the third division at all.
Longstreet had deeply internalized Lee's original intention of attacking
the enemy on terrain chosen by the Confederates. He suggested to Lee on
the first two days of the battle that he push the Army of Northern
Virginia between Washington and the Army of the Potomac and allow
himself to be attacked there. Longstreet delayed the start of the attack
on July 2nd and changed the operational plan on his own, so that Lee had
to agree to introduce the three divisions planned for the attack into
the battle in a staggered manner in terms of time and space. Lee, who
was with Longstreet in the early afternoon, did nothing to stop
Longstreet's dalliances and rode back to his headquarters without
forcefully putting Longstreet in his place.
Even after the attack
began on July 2, the Confederates experienced coordination problems. The
attack on the left flank of the Union Army began promisingly, but the
gradual intervention of the brigades (the “attack en échelon”) broke off
when two brigades of Anderson's division did not take up the attack as
planned. This resulted in Wright's brigade receiving no support on
Cemetery Ridge. Similar coordination problems occurred in Early's
division's attack on Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 2, when the
movements of the Confederate divisions of Rodes, Early, and Pender
(after the latter's mortal wounding under General Lane) were not well
coordinated, so Early's two brigades could not were supported.
On July 3, Meade Lee first thwarted plans when the
Army of the Potomac attacked Ewell and prevented a joint action by the
Army of Northern Virginia on the wings. Longstreet, contrary to Lee's
orders, had an attack prepared against the left flank of the Army of the
Potomac. Since a coordinated attack had become impossible, Lee decided
to attack the center of the Army of the Potomac. Lee Longstreet
commissioned the implementation. He actually didn't want to carry out
the attack because he thought it was wrong.
From today's
perspective, Pickett's attack was an absurd operation. At the time of
Napoleonic warfare, such an attack was still quite normal, and
especially at Chancellorsville, Lee's troops had repeatedly attacked the
positions of the Army of the Potomac head-on and were successful,
despite the now greater firepower of the defenders. Lee had unlimited
confidence in the superior ability of the Army of Northern Virginia,
especially the great victory at Chancellorsville and the defeat of the
Army of the Potomac in the battles of July 1st made him believe so. But
he overlooked the fact that the enemy was not the poorly led Army of the
Potomac of May, but a well-led and bravely fighting army with high
firepower.
Pickett recognized early on that once the target had
been captured, reinforcements would be necessary in order to maintain
and expand the success. As he approached, he sent an officer to ask
Longstreet to send reinforcements. Longstreet was otherwise occupied -
throughout the attack he was reportedly more concerned with small
details than with the attack. In fact, Anderson's division was ready. He
wrote in his report on August 7, 1863:
“… I was about to move
forward Wright’s and Posey’s brigades, when Lieutenant-General
Longstreet directed me to stop the movement, adding that it was useless,
…”
Lee, as always after giving the order to attack the enemy, had
left the entire implementation at Longstreet's discretion. Here Lee
could have recognized that Longstreet was not convinced of the success
of the attack and therefore should have assigned another general to
carry out the attack.
Grant captured Vicksburg the day after Pickett's
Charge. Lee had succeeded in preventing Grant's reinforcements, but the
irreconcilable differences of opinion between Johnston and Jefferson
Davis led to the fall of Vicksburg.
Historian James M. McPherson
sees the closely spaced Confederate defeats at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and
Chattanooga as one of four crucial “turning points” that determined the
eventual outcome of the Civil War. However, when it comes to Gettysburg,
this view is contradicted by other historians who argue that the Battle
of Gettysburg's impact on the course of the war was small. The basic
pattern of the war - successes of the northern states in the western
theater of war while at the same time stalemate in the east - did not
change as a result of Gettysburg. The Confederate invasion of
Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg presented an opportunity to
break out of this stalemate, either through a decisive Confederate
victory or through the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia, but
neither occurred. The meaning of Gettysburg lies more in what could have
happened than in what actually happened.
The devastating effects
of the battle were still visible four months later when the National War
Cemetery on Cemetery Hill was dedicated on November 19. There, President
Lincoln gave the famous Gettysburg Address, in which he called on the
nation to believe in a common future between the warring parties, so
that no soldier should die in vain in defense of democracy.
The
Army of Northern Virginia reached Virginia in good order: the
Confederates had been beaten but not decisively defeated. The material
losses were limited, but the personnel losses were heavy. Lee
nevertheless managed to largely restore the army's human and material
fighting strength after returning it to Virginia. The Army of Northern
Virginia continued to fight for nearly two more years, remaining at all
times a dangerous enemy on the battlefield.
General Lee had words of encouragement for the
returning soldiers. When they saw him, many people tore their hats off
and cheered Lee. To Pickett, Lee said:
“… this has been my fight
and upon my shoulders rests the blame.”
Lee consistently did not
blame any of his subordinates for the defeat in his report on the
campaign. Lee was dejected after the battle. However, he did not neglect
his duties as commander-in-chief of the Army of Northern Virginia and
led the defeated army back to Virginia. Once there, Lee asked the
President for relief on August 8, 1863.
The discussion about the
“Lost Cause”, a supposedly just cause for which the southern states
fought, arose at the end of the Civil War. The aim of this ideology was,
among other things, to keep the self-esteem of the soldiers of the South
high. Military defeats like that of Gettysburg were solely due to the
technical and numerical superiority of the armies of the North. In this
context, it is often claimed that the Confederacy would have won the war
without the defeat at Gettysburg. Confederate Memorial Day was soon
established to commemorate the South's fallen soldiers. In the early
1870s, Early and a few other former leaders founded the Southern
Historical Society (SHS), which began heroizing Southern war aims and
Generals Lee and Jackson.
The New York Times wrote an article
about the Army of the Potomac in 1872. James Longstreet informed the
editor in charge about decisions during the Battle of Gettysburg that,
in his opinion, should have been made. Longstreet accused General Lee of
making crucial mistakes.
General Early therefore violently
attacked Longstreet in a speech on the second anniversary of General
Lee's death at Washington and Lee University. Early branded Longstreet
an apostate marked by the Mark of Cain. In his response, Longstreet
accused Ewell and Stuart of being complicit in the defeat. Replies and
retorts went back and forth, and other southern personalities also spoke
up. The belief in a “Lost Cause” was given new nourishment.
General Longstreet was particularly suitable as a scapegoat for the
defeat at Gettysburg. Longstreet had not been squeamish about his former
wartime comrades in his memoirs, in which he had attempted to justify
his actions. He was friends with Ulysses S. Grant before the war and
rekindled that friendship after the war ended. Longstreet also joined
the Republican Party and supported Federalist positions.
After
being ostracized by many former colleagues, Longstreet withdrew from the
public eye. His reputation as a leader remained intact among the
soldiers. Years later, when Longstreet traveled to a memorial service,
veterans recognized him and greeted him with applause.
The
discussion about the “Lost Cause” expanded over the years and included
other leaders of the Confederacy in addition to the people involved in
Gettysburg. It only diminished in intensity towards the end of the 20th
century. Those responsible for these discussions succeeded in giving Lee
and Jackson the status of heroes among both warring parties and
maintaining this status to this day. In historical revisionist circles,
however, General Longstreet remains the culprit for the failure of
southern dreams of independence.
The Battle of Gettysburg also had repercussions on a
cultural level. Numerous participants, especially on the Union side,
became “heroes” of the nation through their role in the battle, such as
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, John Buford and Winfield Scott Hancock. On
the Confederate side, George Pickett was particularly well known. This
was supported by the implementation of the battle in film and
literature. Gettysburg is considered the most written about battle of
the Civil War. Michael Shaara's novel The Killer Angels, published in
1973, is particularly well known. The author describes the battle and
pays particular attention to the role of the 20th Maine Regiment and its
commander, Colonel Chamberlain. The book won the Pulitzer Prize and was
made into a film in 1993 under the title Gettysburg. Gettysburg is also
the theme of numerous computer games, and the power metal band Iced
Earth processed the battle musically in a half-hour suite called
Gettysburg 1863 (on the album The Glorious Burden).
The
Gettysburg National Military Park was created around the battlefield and
military cemetery at the opening of which Abraham Lincoln gave his
famous speech, the Gettysburg Address.
USS Gettysburg was and is
also the name of three warships of the US Navy.